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Introduction 
On December 6, 2017, the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) delivered its much-
awaited judgment on whether it is compatible with Article 101(1) TFEU to prohibit 
the sale of luxury products via third-party online platforms or whether such a practice 
rather amounts to a restriction “by object” within the meaning of the same article. The 
case attracted the immediate attention of media and legal scholars primarily because it 
has practical implications for brand manufacturers, resellers, mobile consumers using 
their smartphones and tablets to make purchases as well as for the digital single 
market at large.  Additionally, the Coty judgment clarifies the scope of an older ECJ 
ruling, i.e. the one in the Pierre Fabre case1, according to which any clause in a 
selective distribution contract by which the authorised distributors are completely 
prohibited to sell products to the consumers via the internet is a restriction of 
competition by object.   
Facts 
Coty Germany GmbH (“Coty Germany”) is a leading supplier of luxury cosmetics in 
Germany. It sells specific luxury cosmetic brands via a selective distribution network 
in virtue of a distribution contract employed in a uniform way throughout Europe, “in 
order to support the luxury image of its brands”.2 Selective distribution is supposed to 
be an efficient distribution arrangement either for complex technical products, such as 
cars, or for products whose purchase is closely related to a particular brand image, 
such as cosmetics, perfumes and luxury goods in general.3 In this way, it is assured 
that the retail store will provide the consumer with a shopping experience consistent 
with the product’s brand and reputation.4 In the context of its distribution network 
contracts, Coty Germany included a new clause (Clause I(1)(3)) which contemplated 
that its authorised retailers were entitled to offer and sell the products on the internet 
only via their own internet sites/online stores and not by making use of third-party 
platforms in a discernible manner. In this way, the use of a different business name as 
well as the recognisable engagement of a third-party undertaking was forbidden.  
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1 Case C-439/09 Pierre Fabre Dermo-Cosmétique SAS v. Président de l’ Autorité de la concurrence 
and Ministre de l’ économie, de l’ industrie et de l’ emploi [2011] ECR I- 9419.  
2 Case C-230/16 Coty Germany GmbH v Parfümerie Akzente GmbH ECLI:EU:C:2017:941, para. 10. 
3 Paolo Buccirossi “Vertical Restraints on E-Commerce and Selective Distribution” (2015)11(3) JCLE 
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Parfümerie Akzente GmbH (“Parfümerie Akzente”), an authorised retailer of Coty 
Germany’s products for many years, which was making internet sales partly through 
its own online store and partly via the platform “amazon.de”, decided not to sign the 
amendments to the selective distribution contract and disapprove the new clause.  As 
a result, Coty Germany brought an action before the competent National Court of 
First Instance in order to prevent the former from distributing the latter’s products via 
the platform “amazon.de”, in accordance with Clause I(1)(3). 
The National Court of First Instance dismissed Coty Germany’s action on the ground 
that the clause at issue was contrary to Article 101(1) TFEU as well as to Paragraph 1 
of the German Law against restrictions of competition. It was held that such a clause 
constitutes a hardcore restriction under Article 4(c) of the Vertical Agreements Block 
Exemption Regulation No 330/2010 and that it cannot be justified even for the sake of 
the brand’s prestigious image. The relevant court drew this conclusion based on the 
judgment of 13 October 2011 in the Pierre Fabre case. Moreover, the clause at issue 
could not benefit from an individual exemption since Coty Germany had not managed 
to prove that the overall prohibition on internet sales via third-party platforms could 
bring efficiency gains that would outweigh the competition disadvantages in the 
market. After all, such a general prohibition could not pass the proportionality test, as 
there were other means, equally appropriate and less restrictive of competition that 
Coty Germany could take, like the application of specific quality criteria for the use of 
third-party platforms.  
Coty Germany appealed against the decision of the First Instance court before the 
Higher Regional Court, Frankfurt am Main, Germany.  The relevant Court of Appeal 
decided to stay the proceedings and ask the ECJ for a preliminary ruling, uncertain as 
it was about whether the contractual arrangement existing between both parties to the 
dispute was lawful under EU competition law.  
Judgment  
The ECJ confirmed the legality of selective distribution systems, to the extent that 
resellers, such as Parfümerie Akzente, are chosen on the basis of objective criteria of a 
qualitative nature that are laid down uniformly for all potential resellers and are 
applied in a non-discriminatory fashion, without going beyond what is necessary.5 It 
also restated that in case of luxury goods, the characteristics and conditions of a 
selective distribution network preserve and ensure the aura of luxury that such goods 
have apart from their high-quality material characteristics.6 Therefore, as long as the 
aforementioned criteria are met, the adoption of a selective distribution network for 
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Ministre de l’ économie, de l’ industrie et de l’ emploi [2011] ECR I- 9419, para. 41; Case C-
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luxury goods is absolutely in line with Article 101(1) TFEU and this cannot be 
doubted by the assertion included in paragraph 46 of the judgment in Pierre Fabre 
case. That assertion should be read and interpreted only in relation to the context of 
that particular judgment.7  
Regarding contractual clauses such as the one at issue, the ECJ held that they are not 
precluded either under Article 101(1) TFEU, since they are designed to preserve the 
luxury image of goods in the context of a selective distribution system which was held 
to be completely lawful under Article 101(1) TFEU. However, similarly to selective 
distribution systems, in order to be lawful, a contractual clause, such as that at issue, 
should meet the criteria mentioned above. This means that 1) it should have the 
objective of preserving the luxury image of goods, 2) it should be laid down 
uniformly and it should not be applied in a discriminatory fashion, 3) it should be 
proportionate in the light of the objective pursued.  
Further, the ECJ clarified that a clause, such as that at issue, does not constitute a 
restriction of customers, within the meaning of Article 4(b) of the Vertical 
Agreements Block Exemption Regulation No 330/2010 nor does it restrict passive 
sales to end users within the meaning of Article 4(c) of the same Regulation. This is 
so because the clause at issue does not prohibit the use of the internet as a means of 
marketing the contract goods.8 Additionally, the selective distribution contract at issue 
allows, under certain conditions, authorised distributors to advertise via the internet 
on third-party platforms and to use online search engines.9 As a result, customers are 
still able to find the online offer of authorised distributors by using such engines.  
Comments 
The ECJ saw in the preliminary questions submitted by the Higher Regional Court a 
great opportunity to clarify the rather vague point made in Pierre Fabre case, 
paragraph 46 of the judgment. According to that paragraph, “the aim of maintaining a 
prestigious image is not a legitimate aim for restricting competition and cannot 
therefore justify a finding that a contractual clause pursuing such an aim does not fall 
within Article 101(1) TFEU”. The ECJ underlined that the above assertion must be 
read and interpreted in the light of that particular judgment’s context and so it is 
related solely to the goods at issue, meaning cosmetic and hygiene goods. Therefore, 
it does not apply to luxury goods. The differentiation made by the ECJ and the 
limitation of Pierre Fabre case to the very specific internet ban situation has brought 
clarity and legal certainty to market participants like the members of selective 
distribution systems. It also put an end to highly divergent interpretations.  
For the first time the ECJ referred to the visibility of third-party online platforms and 
it underlined that the authorised retailers were prohibited to offer and sell the products 
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only on visible third-party platforms. This means that authorised distributors are still 
permitted to sell the luxury goods online via unauthorised third-party platforms when 
the use of such platforms is not discernible to the consumer. It is understood that the 
reason for such a distinction between discernible and indiscernible third-party online 
platforms, is that the former can detract from the luxury image of luxury goods. Yet, 
what is not understood, nor explained by the ECJ is how an unnoticeable third-party 
online platform is able to correspond to specific qualitative conditions better than a 
recognisable and well-known platform, such as Amazon and eBay, which are huge 
players in online sales. It is believed that this is an unequal treatment of third-party 
online platforms which opens the door to grey marketers that will take advantage of 
the situation by trying to take the place of the discernible third-party platforms in the 
market. Such an approach is also quite contradictory to the priority that the suppliers 
and authorised distributors of luxury goods say they have, i.e. to secure the online sale 
of their products in an environment that corresponds to certain qualitative conditions. 
In addition to this, the ECJ enabled the advertisement of luxury products via the 
internet on third-party platforms as well as the use of online search engines so that 
customers may find the online offer of authorised distributors by using such engines. 
In this way, the ECJ avoided an absolute online platform ban as such a thing would 
make it difficult for retailers to access the mobile customer base. This would be a 
great problem, especially for small retailers that become visible and sell products 
through third-party platforms without having to make great investments and efforts.  
Despite the two aforementioned remarkable points made by the ECJ in Coty case, still 
there is residual uncertainty regarding particular issues. The first issue is the definition 
of “luxury goods”. Since the judgment was limited to luxury brand owners, leaving 
out of its scope other brand owners, it would be expected from the ECJ to set clear 
criteria about what amounts to “luxurious products” and what does not. To everyone’s 
great disappointment, this was not done, while the ECJ could easily avoid such 
vagueness if it weighed in by adopting or explicitly rejecting the approach of the AG 
Wahl who referred to “high-quality consumer goods” and “brands” apart from luxury 
brands as the ECJ did.10 As a result of this open question, it remains unclear which 
products are supposed to be outside the luxury industry and what applies to them, 
since each EU Member State may have a different point of view about what is luxury 
and what is not, depending on its standard of living. There are also concerns that 
many manufacturers will try to abuse this uncertainty by presenting and promoting 
their products as luxurious ones, though actually they are not luxurious. This may 
happen for the sake of getting extra leeway in the competition rules and in order to 
take advantage of the selective distribution systems.11 This is particularly true if we 
take into account the fact that selective distribution systems are very widespread in 
the EU over the last ten years and they are used by a large number of manufacturers, 
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not only for a particular category of goods.12 By leaving open the issue of what 
“luxurious product” means, it is like enabling brand owners and large retailers to use 
methods that may circumvent the application of selective distribution systems, just in 
order to exclude from distribution networks pure online players, such as Amazon and 
eBay as well as smaller retailers that tend to realise a large proportion of their sales 
via these online platforms. Practically speaking, this means that selective distribution 
systems may turn out to be used even in case of fast moving/day-to-day consumer 
goods, such as clothes, sports shoes or electrical household appliances, as long as they 
are branded as luxurious.  Such a thing may put mobile consumers in danger of not 
having any more the possibility to immediately obtain and compare product and price 
information online as well as to switch quickly from one online channel to another.   
The second issue regards the proportionality test which was missed by the ECJ. The 
ECJ has not adequately explained why it opted for an absolute restriction of using in a 
discernible manner third-party platforms for the internet sale of luxury goods, while it 
could find a less restrictive means in order to fulfill the same objective, which is to 
preserve the luxury image of those goods. The ECJ also refers to the Higher Regional 
Court (i.e. the referring court) to assess the proportionality test and make the relevant 
enquiries.13 Our disagreement with the approach that the ECJ adopted regarding the 
proportionality test is further strengthened by the fact that the defendants made an 
alternative suggestion which was rejected by the court without adequate 
justification.14 The suggestion concerned the contract concluded between the brand 
owner and the authorized reseller, which could include a list of qualitative criteria that 
should be fulfilled by the third-party platform on which the authorised reseller may 
want to sell. According to this suggestion, anytime the platform would not fulfill 
through its structure or presentation these qualitative criteria, the brand owner could 
ask for the cancellation of the contract. However, the court persisted in a measure 
which is situated at the end of the competition restrictions’ spectrum.  
The third aspect of Coty case which remains rather unclear is what will happen after 
this judgment both to 31% of retailers who sell partly via their online shops and partly 
on marketplaces as well as to 4% of retailers who sell online only via marketplaces.15 
Since the use of third-party platforms has increased over time, there will surely be 
retailers across EU either having no other way to sell their products on internet or 
facing financial problems by having to avoid the use of discernible third-party 
platforms for the internet sale of luxury goods, especially for as long as the definition 
of luxury goods is not clarified.  This is particularly true in EU Member States, where 
third-party platforms play a really important role. In Germany, for instance, 62% of 
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retailers use marketplaces, in the United Kingdom 43% and in Poland 36% of them.16 
Furthermore, it is small and medium-sized retailers that mostly use third-party 
platforms as a sales channel17, therefore the risk of not being able to bear the cost of 
such a prohibition is imminent. In view of these parameters, it is argued that there 
may be cases in certain EU Member States where the third-party platform ban, even 
under the conditions set by the ECJ, will amount to a hardcore restriction according to 
the Vertical Agreements Block Exemption Regulation No 330/2010. 
In conclusion, Coty case could be characterised as a pyrrhic victory of the ECJ. On 
the one hand it managed to fill the interpretative gaps of Pierre Fabre case, but on the 
other hand it has raised a lot of issues which still remain unsolved and uncertain.   
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